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PROPOSITION 13: THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF DEMOGRAPHICS IN 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Abstract 
Proposition 13 revolutionized local politics in California when it stated that any 
future increase in taxes or tax rates would require a vote of two-thirds of the electors in 
any given local jurisdiction. Since California is the sixth largest economy in the world 
and exhibits tremendous economic and demographic variation, this study seeks to 
determine what characteristics of a county can be used to predict whether or not a local 
ballot initiative will pass. In addition, this study attempts to determine whether there is a 
distinction between the predictive value of demographic variables for transportation, 
education, safety, and facilities initiatives.  
This report reveals that greater wealth within a county is associated with a greater 
likelihood of an initiative passing, although at a decreasing rate. The data also suggests 
that a greater percentage of nonwhites in a county is correlated with an initiative passing. 
In counties with larger elderly populations, initiatives are less likely to pass. Furthermore, 
the data indicates that the impact of demographics varies for transportation, education, 
safety, and facilities initiatives.  
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I. Introduction 
 Passed in 1978, Proposition 13 sought to limit rapidly increasing property taxes 
and give voters greater control over government finances via the ballot box. At the same 
time, as a result of this proposition California gained national attention as a pioneer in 
direct democracy and other states began to take a closer look at direct voter control. 
Proposition 13 states that “the maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property 
should not exceed 1% of the full cash value of such properties.” In Section 4 it states, 
"Cities, counties, and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of 
such district, may impose special taxes on such districts, except ad valorem taxes on real 
property” (Rabushka, 1982, appendix A).  
 
What are the factors that led to the approval of Proposition 13? 
 In many ways, Proposition 13 offered a means for Californians to vocalize their 
concerns about an era of tax growth that had begun in the post-Depression period. Seeing 
a rapidly growing welfare state, voters wanted control over taxation, especially the 
taxation of property. According to Rabushka, "The growth of the welfare state since the 
Great Depression and the development of a massive array of non-defense government 
spending programs over the past three decades has brought overall taxation to about 40% 
of personal income” (1982, p. 5).  
 Inflation also became a concern in California, as the average inflation rate 
between 1970 and 1978 was 6.7 percent (Rabushka, 1982, p. 7). Rising inflation 
translated to higher property taxes and increasing state taxes overall. According to Sears 
and Citrin, “prices for single-family homes in the San Francisco area grew by an annual 
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rate of approximately 18 percent between 1973 and 1978 (1982, p. 22). In addition, the 
public viewed inflation as an issue of great concern; at the time, controlling inflation 
polled as the number one national priority (Rabushka, 1982, p. 7).  
 In California inflation resulted in individuals being grouped into higher tax 
brackets through the national progressive tax system, and a phenomenon known as 
"bracket creep” plagued Californians. Although, for many, income was rising with 
inflation, income was also taxed at a higher rate and purchasing power was diminished 
(Rabushka, 1982, p. 8). In other words, even as individuals were being taxed at a higher 
rate, their take-home incomes had less purchasing power. This was further complicated 
by the fact that personal tax exemptions did not keep pace with rising inflation. As 
Rabushka notes, this meant that, “bracket creep thus [raised] taxes without direct 
increases in the tax rate schedules” (1982, p. 8). Californians reacted strongly against the 
continually increasing income tax rates that began setting in after 1965. Californians were 
not only subject to bracket creep, but "residents of the Golden State were paying 1/3 
more in state and local taxes as a share of personal income than were the residents of the 
other 49 states” (Rabushka, 1982, p. 9). It became apparent to many that the government 
was not going to be responsive to the erosion of purchasing power or to bracket creep.  
 The growth of the government between 1973 and 1977 was an additional factor 
behind the drafting of Proposition 13. Between these years, government "expenditure in 
California grew by an average of 11.2 percent a year, and the state spent more than the 
national norm for both the widely popular fire and police services and the much-despised 
welfare programs” (Sears and Citrin, 1982, p. 23). Additionally, employment in the 
public sector was outpacing job growth in the private sector (Sears and Citrin, 1982, p. 
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23). Thus, while voters were supportive of safety revenue initiatives, there was a 
tremendous backlash against the encroachment of welfare programs on their personal 
wealth, programs which many voters felt did not benefit them directly. As a result, 
California experienced an ideological shift with respect to government services. A 
growing concern emerged that the government was becoming both inefficient and 
wasteful. According to Rabushka, “the percentage of people who said that the 
government wastes much of our tax money rose substantially, from 48 percent in 1964 to 
74 percent in 1978” (Rabushka, 1982, p. 11).  
 Proposition 13 passed by a 2 to1 margin. Despite the popularity of the initiative, 
there were many campaigns against Proposition 13 both on its own grounds and on the 
grounds that it offered too much control over finances to the public. Educators and police, 
for example, feared that direct voter control over state fiscal policy would dramatically 
undermine their funding. Educators, represented by the 35,000 member California 
Federation of Teachers, predicted massive public school closings (Rabushka, 1982, p. 25). 
Firefighters also feared funding cuts: "In some fire districts,” it was claimed, “up to half 
of the fire stations might be closed due to lack of funds” (Rabushka, 1982, p. 25). Many 
also feared that Proposition 13 would work against historically disadvantaged groups 
since demonstrated that wealthier populations could utilize the ballot boxes to control 
program funding for ethnic minorities. 
 In retrospect, it is worth asking whether these fear become a reality after 
Proposition 13 was passed. Kim Rueben and Pedro Cerdán, in “Fiscal Effects of Voter 
Approval Requirements on Local Governments,” suggest that there is not much evidence 
pointing to schools closing or safety programs being drastically scaled back. Rueben and 
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Cerdán also note that “following Proposition 13, own-source revenues fell dramatically in 
California. By 1997, approximately 45 percent of California’s local government funds 
came from another level of government” (2003, p. 14). With funding coming from other 
sources, California’s programs were not dissolved even as much of the financial support 
necessary to continue these programs would no longer be raised at the local level. The 
decrease of own-source revenue in counties was especially evident in education: 
“California school districts went from having 55 percent of funds from local sources to 
having a little over one-third whereas own-source revenues in school districts in other 
states fell only from 54 to 46 percent” (Rueben and Cerdán, 2003, p. 17).  
Despite doomsday predictions about the effects of Proposition 13, many of the 
fears centered on education did not materialize. In fact, employment cuts in the public 
school system were moderated after the passage of Proposition 13: “Of [pre-Prop 13 
layoffs] 11,708 were school district employees; in one month’s time, school districts had 
rehired over 2,000 laid off employees” (Rabushka, 1982, p. 80). Moreover, California 
experienced an economic boom in the post-Proposition 13 era, and California’s 
unemployment rate dropped from 7.4 percent to 6.7 percent between September and 
October of 1978 (Rabushka, 1982, p. 80).  
 
Goals of the Study 
 As some studies show that voters were willing to approve new funding sources, 
this report will explore the question of which factors that determine which ballot 
initiatives voters tend to approve. What demographic characteristics of a county can be 
used to predict whether a local ballot initiative will pass or not? Is there a distinction 
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between the predictive value of demographics variables in votes on transportation, 
education, safety, and facilities initiatives? These questions can be answered by 
examining ballot initiatives and their success rates across California’s 58 counties from 
1995 to 2003.  
 This report may help to predict future local ballot initiatives in California. For 
example, this report may conclude that the given characteristics of Sacramento County 
are correlated with a high passage rate for transportation initiatives. Assuming that 
Sacramento’s demographic characteristics remain the same in the future, the success rate 
of future transportation initiatives can be assessed. This report may also be of value to 
other states initiating direct democracy systems. After California, for example, Oregon 
experienced a similar tax revolt through its initiative system. This analysis may prove 
useful in assessing which counties are likely to approve tax initiatives in states other than 
California. However, political attitudes towards taxes and government spending may vary 
from state to state. Therefore, this report should serve as a guideline and not as a hard-
and-fast rule.  
 
II. Review of Existing Literature 
 The two major works that analyze the characteristics that affect the passage of 
California propositions come from the Public Policy Institute of California: “Fiscal 
Effects of Voter Approval Requirements on Local Governments” by Kim S. Rueben and 
Pedro Cerdán (2003) and “Are There Winners and Losers? Race, Ethnicity, and 
California’s Initiative Process” by Zoltan Hajnal and Hugh Louch (2001).  
Rueben and Cerdán’s paper analyzed the relationship between local and state 
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governments that resulted from Proposition 13, focusing on government’s greater 
dependence on state funds. These authors showed that following the passage of 
Proposition 13 voters in many areas approved new tax measures; however, underfunding 
in other areas of the state led to the state “bailing out” local governments: “Although 
voters are playing an increasingly important role in fiscal decision-making process, they 
are willing to approve new funding sources… However, voter preferences may leave 
some traditional government services inadequately funded” (Rueben and Cerdán, 2003, p. 
xii). Rueben and Cerdán examined the descriptive power of city demographics in bond 
elections for education, showing that “Income was highest for districts that successfully 
passed a bond measure and lowest for districts that proposed but did not pass a bond” 
(2003, p. 29). They also quantified the effect of a lower-than-state-average household 
income on the passage rates of education bonds: “Changing the average household 
income in a district from the state average ($40,754) to a lower level ($32, 712) also 
diminishes the chances of passing a measure from 42 to 40 percent” (2003, p. 35). 
Analyzing the effect of demographics on tax measures, these authors showed that cities 
with higher incomes were more likely to pass a new tax measure than lower income cities 
(Rueben and Cerdán, 2003, p. 60). These authors concluded that income is an important 
variable in both bond and tax measures, and that race correlates with this rule, as “cities 
that passed new taxes had a lower percentage of nonwhite households than those that 
were not successful at raising new funds” (2003, p. 60).  
 The second paper, “Are There Winners and Losers?: Race, Ethnicity, and 
California’s Ballot Initiative Process” (Hajnal and Louch, 2001) addressed the effects of 
Proposition 13 on racial and ethnic groups. Inspiring this research was that fact that in 
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several scenarios racial minorities were at a severe disadvantage since non-Hispanic 
whites made up two-thirds of the voters in local initiative elections (Hajnal and Louch, 
2001, p. v). Despite the fact that California is the first large minority-majority state—
meaning that the white population makes up less than 50 percent of the state—whites 
make up more than 68 percent of registered voters. Hajnal and Louch’s paper sought to 
answer the question of to what degree racial minority’s interests were being undermined 
as a result of direct democracy and to what extent “the white majority dominate[s] 
outcomes at the expense of blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans” (2001, p. 5).  
 This study, focusing on initiatives that directly affected Latinos, blacks, and 
Asian-Americans, attempted to assess racial trends in direct democracy: “To measure 
interests and outcomes in direct democracy,” the authors gathered data from a series of 
17 Los Angeles Times exit polls that queried voters on 45 initiatives between 1978 and 
2000” (2001, p. vi). Such Propositions as 187—the “Save Our State” initiative—were 
viewed by many as an attack on the Latino community intended to “deny public 
education, social services, and health services to illegal aliens” (Hajnal and Louch, 2001, 
p. 18). The Latino community strongly opposed the initiative, with 80 percent of Latinos 
voting “no” along with 53 percent of black and Asian-American voters. As Hajnal and 
Louch note, however, “strong white support (63 percent in favor) overwhelmed the 
minority vote, and the initiative passed” (2001, p. 19).  
 Based on their research overall, Hajnal and Louch concluded that there is no 
major bias against particular ethnic groups despite the fact that in many elections the 
results for initiatives contrasted with how certain ethnic communities voted:  
 
Mills 11 
White voters, who are the most successful racial or ethnic group, have a 62 
percent probability of voting for the winning side. Asian Americans fall in the 
middle, with a 60 percent probability of voting for the winning side. The average 
Latino and black voters fared marginally worse—voting for the winning side 
roughly 59 percent of the time. (2001, p. 28) 
Thus, by examining a set of ballot initiatives, Hajnal and Louch determined that the 
percent probability of voting for the winning side is relatively close among the ethnic 
groups studied, with slightly lower numbers for Latino and black voters. However, 
Hajnal and Louch also found that ethnic groups were generally divided over which 
initiatives to support (2001 p. 62). Often, black voters did not side with Asian-American 
or Latino voters, and vice-versa. Complicating matters further, these researchers raised an 
important issue in noting that smaller ethnic communities exist within broad racial 
groupings. For example, Philippino-American voters may be opposed to an initiative that 
Chinese-American voters support.  
 Grounded in and expanding on this existing literature, this report analyzes the 
correlation of local demographics to the probability of transportation, education, facilities, 
and safety initiatives passing. While previous reports have looked at the general 
predictive value of demographics, this report will focus more closely on the types of 
initiatives that demographic variables predict. For example, does overall age affect the 
probability of an education initiative passing more than the probability of transportation 
measure passing? Essentially, this report extends Rueben and Cerdán’s analysis of 
education measures and demographics to three other major revenue initiative categories. 
While Rueben and Cerdán found that income was an important factor in education bond 
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elections, this paper will analyze the importance of income and other factors in 
transportation, facilities, and safety initiatives. Further, this will extend Rueben and 
Cerdán’s data through to 2003. The descriptive power of the race variable will also be 
more specific. In consideration of Hajnal and Louch’s finding that support for initiatives 
varied across ethnic minority lines, this report will more specifically at the descriptive 
power of the percentage of Latinos, blacks, and Asian-Americans rather than looking 
only at percent of nonwhite households. 
 Hajnal and Louch’s paper sought to discover the degree of bias involved in 
California’s initiative process and for that reason restricted the authors restricted their 
analysis to particular policy initiatives. This study will instead look at trends among 
revenue initiatives. Hajnal and Louch studied 45 minority-related initiatives from 1978-
2000. This report will examine all initiatives in the categories of education, transportation, 
safety, and facilities.  
 
III. Methodology 
 The econometric analysis will involve ballot initiative data obtained from the 
California Elections Data Archive (CEDA), a central repository of local election data 
compiled by the Center for California Studies and the Institute of Social Research. CEDA 
data includes ballot initiative results from county, city, community college, and school 
district elections. Data is summarized by year and is available from 1995 to 2003. 
 Demographic data was obtained from Community Sourcebook of America, in 
which data is organized by California’s 58 counties based on 2000 census information for 
age, race, and income. Although the particular demographic values for each year (from 
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1995-2003) may have resulted in more accurate predictive powers, this tactic was 
avoided due to the potential for multicollinearity. For example, the percentage of Latinos 
in Alameda in 1999 is likely to be strongly correlated with the percentage of Latinos in 
2000, and such correlations could pose a threat to the internal validity of the study. 
Furthermore, demographic values for each year would likely be based on projections 
from the 1990 and 2000 census. The accuracy of these projections could be called into 
question.                       
The analysis is limited in scope to education, safety, transportation, and facilities 
initiatives. These four categories were chosen because they deal with taxes directed to the 
funding of public goods and services in which constituents will likely have an interest. 
This report assumes that when voters go to the ballot box they decide whether or not to 
vote for particular initiatives based on the areas from which they feel that they are most 
likely to benefit. The education initiatives analyzed include those referenda related to 
school renovations, construction, and technology. The broader “safety” category includes 
initiatives related to jails/courts, police, fire, multiple emergency services, emergency 
medical/paramedic, firearms, and civil fines/criminal penalties. Transportation 
propositions include initiatives related to mass transit, roads, traffic regulation/reduction, 
and agency funding. Finally, facilities initiatives involve libraries, health facilities, 
museum/cultural/community centers, public works, zoos, sports facilities, convention 
centers, parks and recreation, and jails/courts.  
 This study incorporates a logistic regression model similar to the probit model 
based on a maximum likelihood estimation and involving an “S-shaped” distribution that 
constrains the estimated probabilities between zero and one. The logistic regression (or 
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logit model) uses maximum likelihood estimation. To ensure consistency, probit 
regressions were also run on the data sets. The linear regression model was avoided 
because yielded values in this model can be greater than 1 or less than 0, making results 
difficult to interpret.  
The binary dependent variable corresponds to the probability of an initiative 
passing, with a value of one if it passes and zero if it fails to pass. The independent 
variables include race, age, and income, and the logistic regression will model the 
probability of an initiative passing as a function of these variables. 
Pr (transportation pass=1/age, race, income)= 
    1                                                        
1 + e-(Bo + B1%black + B2%Asian + B3Hispanic + B4Median Household 
Income + B
5
%Age 65-84)
 In the example above, the logistic regression model will find the probability of a 
transportation initiative passing as a function of the explanatory variables of age, race, 
and income. Similar models will be used for the other three categories (education, 
facilities, and safety). The age variable included the percentage of the population for each 
county between the ages of 65-84. This variable has been included in other models 
because elderly voters may have different interests than younger voters. Breakdowns by 
the younger age categories were also included in the regressions. Those with higher than 
median incomes are generally thought to be opposed to tax increases while lower income 
voters may be more inclined to vote in their favor. For the variable of race, the percentage 
of blacks, Latinos, and Asian-Americans in each county was chosen rather than a dummy 
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variable. As suggested earlier, race variables are of particular interest because California 
is the only minority majority state, meaning that “nonwhites” compose more than 50% of 
the state. A complete table of all of the demographics variables used in this analysis can 
be found in Appendix Table 1. 
 What if age and income level combined affect the probability of an initiative 
passing? Does race affect the probability of an initiative passing at different income 
levels? This report will attempt to answer these questions through the application of 
interaction terms. For example, (age * income) and (race * income) are two potential 
interaction terms that will be included in the logistic regression analysis. The research is 
unique in that it will attempt to quantify levels of interaction between variables and to 
draw conclusions about whether these interactions have explanatory power. For example, 
does the combined effect of age and income have greater explanatory power in the 
passing of an education initiative or a safety initiative? 
 One potential problem related to the data is the problem of internal validity. A 
potential sample selection bias exists since not all voters will cast their ballots on every 
issue. Certain voters, for instance, may only vote about education measures while 
declining to vote on safety initiatives.  
 The variables that were accounted for in the referendum data include county 
number, jurisdiction, typecode, and passfail. The county number is a numerical value 
assigned to each of California’s 58 counties. The jurisdiction variable distinguishes 
between county, city, and school district. For the purpose of analytical clarity, a dummy 
variable of one was assigned for those referenda proposed at the county and city levels 
while those proposals at the school district received a value of zero. “Typecode” is a 
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numeric code designated for the type of referendum. This was used to distinguish 
between transportation, safety, facilities, and education initiatives. 
 
 
IV. Preliminary Results 
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 The preliminary results include an aggregate picture of revenue initiatives by year 
and by type. This chart includes all of the revenue initiatives proposed from 1995 to 2003. 
Education initiatives are proposed more often than initiatives in the other four categories. 
There are no clear trends indicating whether safety, facilities, or transportation initiatives 
are most likely to be proposed. Moreover, even-numbered years (such as 1996, 1998, 
2000) contain more of revenue initiatives since they are years in which candidate 
elections were held. 
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 This chart shows, by year and type, the rates at which initiatives proposed were 
passed. Education initiatives from 1995 to 2003 have had more than a 50 percent success 
rate for each year. While these preliminary results indicate the number proposed and 
percent passed for individual categories, the research to follow will attempt to analyze 
characteristics that determine the probability of an initiative passing. Separate logistic 
regressions were run for each referendum as well as logistic regressions for each 
referendum category. 
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V. Regression Results 
Transportation 
 
 Results for the transportation category are summarized in Appendix Table 2. The 
regression included 92 observations. With respect to race, the percentage of Hispanics is 
statistically significant at 1% and has a positive coefficient. This outcome suggests that 
an increase in the percentage of Hispanics in a particular county is associated with an 
increase in the likelihood of a transportation referendum passing. The percentage of 
blacks and Asians are near significant; however, one cannot say that these variables are 
definitely correlated the probability of an initiative passing. The age groups 25-44 and 
65-84 are also statistically significant. This regression indicates that the coefficient 
becomes increasingly negative as age increases, showing that the likelihood of an 
initiative passing falls among older citizens. Median household income is significant and 
positively correlated with the probability of a transportation initiative passing.  
 What is the economic significance of these results? To answer this question, this 
model predicted the probability of a transportation referendum passing given the median 
values for % black (2.2), % Asian (3.3), % Hispanic (17.65), age (35.9), and household 
income ($46, 273). These median values were based on median values across counties. 
For ease of interpretation, median age—a statistically significant variable—was used as 
opposed to percent breakdown by age bracket. Given the median values for age, race, and 
income, the predicted probability of a transportation initiative passing is 41.2%. Also, 
increasing the median household income by $10,000 is associated with an increase in the 
projected probability of the initiative passing. Meanwhile, the greater the increase in 
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median age, the less likely the transportation initiative was to pass. With a median age of 
65, this probability fell to 27.2%.  
Safety 
 Results for the safety category are summarized in Appendix Table 3. The Asian 
and Hispanic variables are statistically significant and are positively correlated with the 
probability of a safety initiative passing. In fact, percent Hispanic is significant at the one 
percent level. The age groups 15-19 and 25-44 were also significant. The 15-19 group 
yielded a considerably larger negative coefficient than the 25-44 group. Unlike in 
transportation, median household income is negatively correlated with the probability of 
a referendum passing; however, the coefficient is quite small.   
 With respect to economic variables, given the same median values for race, age, 
and income, the predicted probability of a safety initiative passing is 45.9%—4.7% 
higher than the probability for transportation initiatives. This is possibly a result of the 
greater likelihood that constituents across categories see initiatives pertaining to police 
and fire services as necessary and beneficial. By contrast, transportation initiatives may 
only benefit particular segments of the population. Since most of the transportation 
referenda were related to public transportation, voters who drive may be less likely to 
vote in favor of them. The slightly negative coefficient for median household income 
may suggest that wealthier segments of the population may live in safer, often gated 
neighborhoods where dependence on police and public safety services is reduced. 
Facilities 
 Results for the facilities category are summarized in Appendix Table 4. Unlike the 
previous regressions, the percentage of both blacks and Asians in a county was 
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statistically significant and positively correlated with a facilities referendum passing. The 
percentage of Hispanics, however, is not significant. Age follows a similar trend in this 
category as in the others, but here the age bracket 65-84 is more strongly correlated with 
an initiative failing. This suggests that the elderly may be less likely to use public goods 
such as parks, zoos, and sports facilities and thus are less likely to vote in favor of 
facilities proposals. Median household income is once again significant and has a 
negative coefficient, although the coefficient suggests that income does not have a strong 
negative impact on facilities referenda.  
 With respect to economic significance, the probability of a facilities initiative 
passing given the median values is 39.8%. This percentage is lower for facilities than for 
both safety and transportation. Several possible reasons may explain why this is the case. 
Facilities initiatives include a wide array of construction projects. As a result, the voter 
may only decide to vote on initiatives in this category that he or she regards as important. 
In contrast, safety, which had the highest projected probability of passing, may be seen 
by the majority of voters as beneficial. Thus, safety initiatives may be more likely to 
receive the required two-thirds majority vote required for initiatives that affect future 
taxes. 
Education 
 The results of the regression analysis pertaining to education initiatives are 
summarized in Appendix Table 5. For this category, none of the demographic variables 
were statistically significant. Several different regressions were applied. One of the 
regressions, for example, included the standard variables for age, race, and income with 
the addition of variables for number of families and average household size. The number 
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of families was near significant, but conclusive evidence cannot be drawn from this result. 
The exact meaning of the term  “number of families” is a bit unclear. Families could 
include children older than 18 who no longer benefit from public schools. With this in 
mind, a regression analysis was run using a variable of the percent of the population less 
than 18. This did not yield a statistically significant result.  
 There are two possible explanations for why demographics did not turn out to be 
significant for education initiatives. First, education initiatives benefit a narrower 
segment of society (those with children) and as a result the interest group is smaller. 
Second, education is the category with the greatest number of observations (1213) and 
thus there is likely to be a greater variety of subjects that the initiatives in this category 
address.  
 In order to examine more closely the impact of income on the probability of an 
initiative passing, a regression was run on all initiatives from the four categories. The 
results from this regression analysis are summarized in Appendix Table 6. It turned out 
that all income values were significant or near significant. This would seem to reflect the 
overall trend that a greater concentration of people with incomes between $50,000 and 
$100,000 is associated with the highest probability of an initiative passing. This number 
decreases slightly in the highest income brackets, perhaps as a result of California’s 
highly progressive tax system. Individuals in the highest income bracket may be less 
likely to vote in favor of a ballot initiative because they recognize that they will be taxed 
at a higher rate for an initiative that they may not benefit from. 
 Also, with all referenda included, an increase in median household income 
increases the probability of an initiative passing by 3.2% (from .6601 to .692). However, 
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when income increases by $50,000, this probability fell to 68.3%. This is consistent with 
the regression indicating that members of a higher income bracket are less likely to vote 
in favor of a referendum than members in lower brackets. An increase in median age by 
ten years increases the probability of an initiative passing by 4.8% (from .662 to .710). 
Meanwhile, a five percent increase in the percentage of nonwhites increases the 
probability of an initiative passing by 3.8% (from .642 to .681).  
 
VI. Summary of Results 
 The purpose of this study was to determine what characteristics of a county can be 
used to predict whether a local ballot initiative will pass. It also sought to discover 
whether there is a distinction between the predictive value of demographics variables 
with regard to transportation, education, safety, and facilities. 
 By means of a logistic regression, this study determined that age, race, and 
income were often very good predictors of the likelihood of an initiative passing. 
Moreover, the levels of significance for these variables did indeed vary across the 
different categories. Often, the magnitude of these variables also varied across categories. 
 Summarizing the econometric results, the variable “percent black” was only 
statistically significant in facilities initiatives, where it increased the probability of an 
initiative passing. “Percent Hispanic” was significant in transportation and safety 
initiatives. “Percent Asian” was significant and positively correlated with the probability 
of a facilities initiative passing. The variable “percent white” was never statistically 
significant. Determining why certain racial groups tend to support certain types of 
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initiatives requires further investigation beyond the scope of this study. As seen in Hajnal 
and Louch’s study, exit polls may be a good method for addressing this question.  
 This research also showed that there are some definite trends correlating age and 
the probability of an initiative passing or failing. The age group 65-84 was more likely to 
vote “no” on ballot initiatives than younger voters. As noted, this negative correlation 
was greatest in facilities initiatives. Median household income was positively correlated 
with transportation initiatives but negatively correlated with facilities and safety 
initiatives, although with small coefficients.  
 Income was consistently a good predictor of an initiative’s success or failure. The 
lowest income bracket (<$25,000) was more positively correlated with an initiative 
passing than the $25,000-$50,000 bracket. Voters with incomes above $150,000 are less 
likely to vote “yes” on ballot initiatives.  
With regard to future policy considerations, the data suggests that greater wealth 
in a county is associated with a greater likelihood of an initiative passing, although at a 
decreasing rate. Also, a greater percentage of nonwhites in a county is correlated with an 
initiative passing, although this varies depending upon the type of the initiative. Finally, 
in counties with a larger elderly population, initiatives are less likely to pass, particularly 
for construction and renovation of facilities. 
With regard to education initiatives, demographics did not have a predictive value. 
 
VII. Policy Considerations 
 Research on California’s referendum process will become increasingly significant 
as California politics comes to depend more on the ballot box. Recently there has been a 
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new trend of lobbying local voters to support referenda. For example, in Fresno, a 
cultural group pushed for an initiative to increase the sales tax by one-tenth of one cent to 
support community arts groups (Schrag, p. 5). Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
meanwhile, is pushing forward an initiative to rezone districts. After failing to get 
approval in the legislature, he is threatening to take the initiative to voters by referendum. 
While many were apprehensive about the ability to pass legislation via the ballot box 
prior to Proposition 13, it is proving to be an effective tool. 
 While the findings of this study do not suggest the presence of hard-and fast rules, 
as voters will likely determine their approval on an issue-to-issue basis, these numbers do 
suggest the probabilities of certain types of initiatives passing given the demographic 
values of various counties, and statistical models used to draw these results can be used to 
predict the likelihood of an initiative passing given the demographics of each county.  
 In terms of future policy considerations, the data suggests that greater wealth in a 
county is associated with a greater likelihood of passing, although at a decreasing rate. 
Also, a greater percentage of nonwhites in a county is correlated with an initiative 
passing, although this varies with the type of the initiative. Finally, in counties with 
greater percentages of the elderly population, initiatives are less likely to pass and this is 
particularly true for construction and renovation of facilities. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
Demographics Variables 
z Race
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- % White, % black, % Asian, % Hispanic 
 
z Age- Median Age, % Age 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-19, 20-
24, 25-44, 45-64, 65-84, 85+ 
 
z Income- Median household income, Per capita income, 
% of households with income: less than 25K, 25K-50K, 
50K-100K, 100K-150K, 150K+, Owner occupied 
household value. 
 
z Other variables- # of households, average household 
size, # of families 
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Appendix Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transportation Results
.0002237** 
(.0001)
Med HH Income 
-.753** 
(.14552) 
%Age 65-84 
.035 
(.14552) 
% Age 45-64 
-.546** 
(.25500) 
% Age 25-44 
-.453 
(.64592) 
% Age 15-19 
-.209* 
(.10972) 
% Asian 
.140*** 
(.04914) 
% Hispanic 
.200* 
(.10825) 
% Black 
*=.1  **=.05  ***=.01 Pr(pass=1); 92 
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Appendix Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety Results
-.456* 
(.264) % Age 65-84 
Dependent Variable: pass=1, if fail= 0 
251 observation Regressor 
-.133 
(.100) % Black 
-.001** 
(.000032) Median Household 
Income 
-.009 
(.120) % Age 45-64 
-.371** 
(.163) % Age 25-44 
-1.558*** 
(.599) % Age 15-19 
.085*** 
(.029) % Hispanic 
.169** 
(.076) % Asian 
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Appendix Table 4                                                                 
Facilities Results 
-.0003*** 
(.0001) 
 
Median Household Income 
 
-1.703** 
(.729)
% Age 65-84 
-.069 
(.124)
% Age 45-64 
-.544** 
(.243)
% Age 25-44 
-1.544 
(1.292)
% Age 15-19 
-.002 
(.040)
% Hispanic 
.172** 
(.086)
% Asian 
.218** 
(.107)
% Black 
Dependent Variable: pass=1, if fail= 0 
240 observations 
Regressor 
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Appendix Table 5 
 
 
                                                                                 Education Results 
Dependent Variable: pass=1, if fail= 0 
1213 observation Regressor 
.0000349 
(.000033) Median household income 
.467 
(.315) % Age 65-84 
-.007 
(.111) % Age 45-64 
.254 
(.238) % Age 25-44 
.854 
(.645) % Age 15-19 
-.139 
(.893) % Age 10-15 
.436 
(.851) % Age 5-10 
-.030 
(.034) % Hispanic 
-.040 
(.087) % Asian 
.139 
(.124) % Black 
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Appendix Table 6 
 
 Regression with all ballot 
initiatives 
.969** 
(.427) 
% HHs 150K+ 
1.186*** 
(.454) 
% HHs 50K-100K 
.459* 
(.241) 
% HHs 25K-50K 
.739** 
(.321) 
% households with less 
than 25K 
Dependent Variable: pass =1, if 
fail= 0 
1796 Observations 
Regressor 
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